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Systematic opportunities for manipulation emerge as a by-product of the structure of all 
group decision processes.  Theory suggests that no process is immune. The study of 
manipulation provides principles and insights about how parts of complex decision systems work 
together and how changes in one part can have broad impact.  Thus, manipulation strategies are 
derived from many features of voting processes.  Often they are the product of changes in the 
decision environment, including rules, procedures and influence on others, in order to achieve a 
specific purpose.  The issues and variables go beyond individual’s own voting strategy within a 
specific setting and whether or not preferences are truthfully revealed – an issue often studied.  
Hopefully, the insights can lead to avenues for improvements to decision processes and thus, 
produce a better understanding of process vulnerabilities.   
Our primary perspective will be the mechanical features of rules and processes; and how 
they interact with behaviors found in theories of public choice and voting. Given that the purpose 
of group choice is, in part, the revelation/discovery of patterns of preferences, the examples 
proceed with the assumption that public information about preferences is limited.  Indeed, the 
power of manipulation seems to be rooted in the lack of information.  Thus, we leave behind 
many interesting variables such as the acquisition and selective use of information, confusing 
language, threats, emotions, misrepresentations, coordinating devices, or even optical illusions.  
See Riker (1986) for examples of the skill taken from historical cases.  
The paper is organized as two sections.  The first is devoted to the overall structure of the 
decision process, the rules, and process decomposition from the point of view of manipulation.  
The second is focused on behavior and how behavior interacts with rules. The logic is closely 
associated with the classical public and social choice model that outcomes are determined by the 
set of options that compete as candidates for the group choice; the preferences or potential 
preferences; the actions available to individuals; the rules that transform individual actions into 
public choices; and, the overall structure of the decision process including the possibility of  
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subgroups meeting separately and organizing some form of coalition. Manipulation takes place 
through control over one or more of these interacting parts. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE DECISION PROCESS AND VOTING RULES 
The structure of a decision process can be viewed as separate from the voting rules. 
Structure encompasses many of the elements of a game in extensive form such as who makes 
what decisions and under what conditions. By contrast, a voting rule is the procedure by which a 
group passes from the information contained in individual ballots to the group choice.   
The section is divided into four parts.  Section A is focused on voting rules.  In part, it is 
the most basic. In the end, all variable work their influence through the voting rule and the 
implications depend on the details found there.  Section B is focused on changes in the set of 
options.  Decision processes do not exhibit the same principles of rationality as individuals.  
Principles of revealed preference do not apply in the sense that choice over expanded sets may 
have no consistency with choice over smaller sets.  When choosing over the set {a,b,c} the 
choice of {a} does not suggest the outcome of the contest from {a,b} or {a,c}.  The classical 
impossibility theorems suggest that for every process there is a circumstance in which that 
consistency property will be violated.  Often, paradoxes and thus opportunities for manipulation 
turn on such features.  Section C explores changes of the voting rule given preferences.  From a 
manipulation point of view, can one influence the outcome given preferences that are known and 
fixed?  Different voting rules have different properties. For a given conflict, the choice of the 
rule can systematically change the group choice even if individual expressions of preferences, 
their votes, are unchanged.  Section D is about organization and the special rules that might 
apply to the process through which opinions become aggregated. 
A. Manipulation within and between voting rules: majority and Borda 
When studying these examples keep in mind that changes in people and procedures are 
the tools of manipulation depends. First, we explore how decisions made with majority rule 
differ from those made by the Borda Count.  Then, we demonstrate the sensitivity of the Borda 
Count to the set of options under consideration.  The discussion expands to include other voting 
systems in which information about the position of an option in individual rankings is included 
as part of the aggregation process. We will then illustrate the difference between processes based 
on the number of people who rank an alternative at the top of the available options.   
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
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Figure 1 is the classical example of the cycling majority voting of three individuals, 
indexed as 1, 2 and 3 and three alternatives indexed as X, Y, and Z.  Each individual has a 
preference ranking as shown.  For example, individual 1 prefers X to Y and prefers Y to Z.  The 
preference of individuals 2 and 3 are the rankings shown in the figure.  A single option is to be 
chosen by voting.  Assume votes mirror preferences, called sincere or non-strategic voting. 
When put to a pairwise vote between X and Y, option X gets votes from 1 and 3 while 2 votes 
for Y over X, so X wins with two votes as opposed to the one.  When Z is put against the winner 
X, we find Z gets two votes and X gets one vote.  Thus, as illustrated in the example, X beats Y, 
Z beats X, and Y beats Z.  The winning position cycles and the ultimate choice would depend on 
the order of voting.  An alternative voting procedure is the Borda Count in which an individual’s 
top option would get 3 points and the others get 2 and 1, respectively. Summing across 
individuals the total is the same, 6, for each of the three options, a three-way tie.    
The existence of the cycle creates an opportunity for manipulation. In the case of 
majority rule, the manipulation would focus on the order of voting and the fact that the last items 
considered are advantaged.  In Borda Count case, the process for resolving ties would contain 
opportunities for manipulation.  Of course, the opportunity for manipulation is presented by the 
fact that the two different rules produce different outcomes. The manipulator would push for a 
rule that produces the manipulator’s most preferred option.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
Figures 2 and 3 provide more refined examples of how different voting rules induce 
different outcomes even if individual preferences remain the same.  From a manipulator’s 
perspective, the choice of outcome reduces to a choice from among rules. In the Figure 2 
example, seven individuals choose from a set of three alternatives.  The preference of each of the 
individuals for three alternatives is shown in the table.  If the voting rule is binary majority rule 
then alternative W beats X by a vote of 4 to 3.  Alternative W also beats Y by a vote of 4 to 3.  
So, as illustrated in Figure 2 if binary choice majority rule is used, the choice is W.  In this case, 
W is called the Condorcet winner, “core” or equilibrium.   
Suppose, however the Borda Count is advanced as an alternative method with all 
individual preferences remaining the same.  If the Borda Count is used in this three-option case, 
each person gives three points to their own top choice, two points to the second from top, and 
one point to the lowest.  As is demonstrated in Figure 2, the group choice is X, which gets 16 
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points as shown on the right, as opposed to 15 for W and 11 for Y.  Thus, the Borda Count will 
produce a different outcome than majority rule.  Individuals 4, 5, and 6 would prefer the use of 
the Borda Count and presumably would push for its use given the opportunity.  
Basically, a choice between Borda Count and majority rule amounts to a choice between 
X and W. Those who prefer W would push for majority rule and those who prefer X would 
implement the Borda count if given an opportunity to influence the rules. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
B. Changing the set of options and voting Rule given individual preferences 
Changes in the set of options can also be a source of manipulation.  Indeed, the sensitivity 
of the social choice to the set of options reveals a deep property of social choices that leads to 
many “paradoxes”.  Social choices do not exhibit the “revealed preference” properties of 
“rationality” that tend to characterize individual choices.  If X is “revealed” better than Y by 
some choice, then the availability of X will prevent the choice of Y in other sets.  If X “is better” 
than Y, then if X is an option Y should not be chosen.  Indeed, it is exactly this property of 
rationality that the impossibility theorems from the Public Choice and Social Choice literature 
demonstrate will be lost in the move from a single, individual choosing agent, to a choosing 
agent that is a group with conflicting individual preferences.
1
  
Figure 3 can be used to illustrate the impact of changes to the set of options.  The 
example can also be used to illustrate the impact of other commonly considered voting rules.  
The example is based on seven individuals as before and four alternatives {W,X,Y,Z}.  
Preferences for the four alternatives are the orderings shown in Figure 3.  Suppose the voting 
rule is the Borda Count and only three alternatives, alternatives {W,X,Y}, are proposed for 
consideration.  Application of the Borda Count has top ranked alternatives receiving a score of 
three, the second receiving a score of two, etc.  As shown in the Figure 3, the voting produces the 
ordering with W the winner followed by X and Y with scores, respectively, 15, 14, and 13. 
Suppose prior to voting, alternative Z is added to the set to be considered for voting. So, 
the set is expanded from the three alternatives {W,X,Y} to the four alternative {W,X,Y,Z} while 
                                                          
1
 This property of revealed preference is often confused with the Arrow axiom of “Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives” Indeed the confusion began with Arrow and, unfortunately, touches much of the popular accounts.  As 
it turns out, the IIA axiom is very innocent if the problem is reformulated as a problem of social choice as opposed 
to the definition of social preference.  In fact, it is a property of almost all social decision processes.  On the other 
hand, the revealed preference features that are mistaken for IIA have normative overtones that can involve 
philosophical issues.  
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no preferences are changed.  The Borda Count now places a score of four on a top rank and three 
on the second, etc.  This change from three alternatives to four causes the Borda Count relative 
vote scores to completely reverse.  With three options the ranking was W over X over Y. Now, 
as shown in Figure 3 the winner is Y over X over W over Z. The respective totals for Y, X, W 
and Z are, respectively, 20, 19, 18, and 13. Notice that the manipulation works in reverse should 
alternative Z, which gets the least points among the four, be dropped from consideration before 
voting. Dropping Z would invert the order of the others. The possibility that the social order 
could be reversed was first discovered by Fishburn (1974) and extended by Plott (1976). 
The example in Figure 3 illustrates the structural impact of changing the set of options 
while preferences and rules are unchanged but can be conveniently extended to illustrate the 
impact of changing voting rule. Specifically, Figure 3 demonstrates the implications of the rules 
(a) vote for your best, (b) vote for your top two, and (c) vote for your top three.  That is, an 
individual gives a point to an option if it is among the top N options in his ranking. So, an 
individual with ranking W,X,Y,Z would give a point to W if the rule is vote for your best. The 
individual would give a point to W and a point to X if the rule is vote for top two, etc. The boxes 
on the right side of the Figure contain the total point tabulation resulting from an application of 
the three rules {vote for the best, vote for top two, vote for top three} to the preferences listed on 
the left.  As can be seen the group will be W or X or Y according to the decision rule. 
Modifications of these processes can involve the elimination of options as they fail to meet the 
criteria when applied in sequence.  Such processes induce still different opportunities for 
manipulation, Grofman and Feld (2004). 
C. Organization and Manipulation 
The organization as opposed to the voting rule can be structured to systematically 
influence the outcomes.  Often processes are complicated with many options and conflicts 
among decision makers.  How the set of options become reduced to “manageable” sizes and who 
participate in such processes become important and can be sources of manipulation.  In this 
section, we introduce a type of divide and conquer process of manipulating group choice, Plott 
and Merlob (2017). 
The opportunity to influence organization and thus manipulate decisions could require 
working through a rules committee or some other means of putting organization in place.  The 
example in Figure 4 is for six alternatives {A, B, C, X, Y, Z} consisting of the first three and last 
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three elements of the alphabet from which only one alternative will be chosen.  The individual 
preferences are in the Figure and the majority rule ordering is {Y, B, X, C, Z, A} so Y is the 
Condorcet winner, which would win a majority if compared to any other alternative. As a 
Condorcet winner Y is the “natural” outcome of a direct voting majority rule voting process so if 
Y is to be avoided the manipulator must avoid a process of direct vote with open proposals, 
which would result in a choice of Y.  
The exercise in Figure 4 reflects an attempt to get X voted as the outcome even though 
both Y and B are preferred to X by a majority.  To accomplish that objective the manipulator 
partitions the set of objectives into two subsets {A, B, C} and {X, Y, Z} and the voters are 
partitioned into two groups.  Using majority rule each group chooses and alternative that will be 
elevated to consideration by the group as a whole. One group, the {A, B, C} group is given the 
responsibility for choosing a single alternative from {A,B,C}.  The other group, the {X,Y,Z} 
group, is to choose a single option from {X,Y,Z} to be considered by the whole group. The two 
alternatives chosen by the subgroups are then placed on a ballot and the choice between the two 
alternatives is by the majority vote of all six people.  
Figure 4 contains the preferences of people assigned to the two groups.  Notice that 
alternative C is the Condorcet winner in the {A,B,C} group and alternative X is the Condorcet 
winner in the {X,Y,Z} group.  So, the two alternatives C and X are elevated to the group as a 
whole. When the pair {C,X} is put to the group as a whole, X will be chosen by a majority and is 
thus the winner. Of course, organizational manipulation requires skill, information about 
processes and the opportunity to implement process detail.  The opportunities to use the 
organizational form of manipulation might be rare but the basic principles are clear. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4] 
SYSTEMS BEHAVIOR AND VOTING RULES 
The examples in the previous section reflected how the technical relationships among 
rules and preferences create opportunities for manipulation.  The technical models rest on a type 
of “sincere” voting behavior in which preferences are translated directly into a voting model 
without modification for strategic purposes or compromise.  This section opens the discussion to 
broader issues of behavior and related potentials for manipulation that behavioral regularities 
bring.  The outcomes from voting groups are systematically related to general principles of 
Public Choice theories and closely related to the technical models discussed in the previous 
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section. The models are neither perfect nor complete.  Neither the limitations nor the capacities 
are fully explored. Consequently, the practitioner should proceed with some precautions.  That 
said, laboratory experiments do reveal important features of the underlying principles at work. 
For summaries of the more recent literature, the reader should consult Bottom, King, Handlin 
and Miller (2008), Wilson (2008a, 2008b), Rietz (2008). 
A. Majority Rule with Unrestricted Proposals 
Groups that operate under simple majority rule with an open proposal process (a partial 
implementation of Roberts Rules of Order) have a tendency to choose alternatives near the 
(generalized) median, equilibrium or core of alternatives should such an equilibrium exist. The 
simplest way to illustrate the basic principles is by an experiment that has been conducted many 
times and in settings much more complex than the illustration used here. The discussion in 
Section (i) assumes a fixed set of individuals and options used to illustrate an important 
principle.  Section (ii) addresses situations in which the preferences represented in the meeting 
can be altered.  The illustration is intended as a demonstration of how the theory works and that 
it is fully within the capacity of human decision makers.  
(i) Fixed Setting 
Figure 5A is a setting with five individuals indexed by {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, who are required to 
use majority rule to choose a single point in the X-Y plane shown in the figure.  Each of the five 
individuals has circular preferences
2
 with a most preferred point located at the appropriate 
number as shown in the figure.  The majority rule equilibrium/core exists for that particular 
configuration of preferences and it is the point of maximum for individual 2, located in the 
interior at the intersection of the classical “contract curves” as shown.  Figure 5B illustrates the 
decisions of several different groups. The pattern here is typical of experimental committees 
(see, for example, Fiorina and Plott, 1978) each of which is operating as a majority rule 
committee in a controlled experiment.  The outcome of a committee deliberation and vote are the 
dots seen disbursed around the equilibrium point as can be seen. When the equilibrium core 
exists, it is an excellent model for predicting the choice of groups that follow loose versions of 
Robert’s Rules of Order.  
                                                          
2
 The preferences are induced with money incentives following classical methods. The data are from Fiorina and 
Plott (1978).  The fact that the underlying options reside in a two dimensional (Euclidian) space is important, giving 
the issues concepts of distance and closeness often not available in political discussions.  If the issues are given 
nonsensical names (e.g. arbitrary letters of the alphabet), the results reflect more scatter.  
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[INSERT FIGURES 5A AND 5B] 
The behavioral models hold implications for manipulation and important aspects of such 
applications.  Four types of manipulation are of interest: attendance influence, preference 
influence, procedural changes and pre-meeting meetings. 
(ii) Committee Member Preference Changes 
Obviously, meeting attendance or other forms of preference changes can alter voting 
dynamics and outcome.  The issue is how the outcome will change in response. Which 
committee members might be considered as a candidate for preference influence and what would 
be the consequences of preference changes?  Meeting attendance is an option that can be 
influenced in a variety of ways.  Examples would include a change of meeting rooms or meeting 
time without proper notification.  The individual(s) might be faced with a need to attend a more 
important meeting due to a (strategically arranged) conflict, etc.  The consequence of preference 
influence is sensitive to the original patterns of preference so must be studied carefully as a 
manipulation strategy.  
[INSERT FIGURE 6] 
Not all preference manipulations result in changes of the committee decision even though 
the dynamics of the meeting or how people feel about the decision might change. In Figure 5A, 
for example, given the configuration the removal of any one member, leaving an even number of 
committee members, would not change the outcome.  The core, equilibrium would remain in the 
same spot – the intersection of the two contract curves.  In Figure 6, successful preference 
changes of, say, individual 1 in the direction of the arrow, would not change the outcome 
because such changes do not change the equilibrium/core.  Amplification of feelings, leaving the 
committee member preference among pairs of options the same but increasing the “strength” of 
preference, will not change the outcome.  The idea is illustrated by the preference of individual 5 
as a larger circle representing a “stronger” preference.  The theory says that the configuration of 
the conflicts matters but changes that leave the configuration, the equilibrium/core, the same, 
will not change the outcome. 
However, that is not to say that attendance and preference manipulations will have no 
impact. They can have substantial impact but it depends on the specific preference changes and 
how they are implemented.  The preference of individual 2 in Figure 5A is at the equilibrium of 
the preferences but if the preference of individual 2 is shifted lower and to the right as in Figure 
9 
 
7A, or if individual 2 cannot make the meeting and is replaced by an alternative person with the 
preferences as shifted, the equilibrium is destroyed.  Pure theory has not resolved the 
consequences but several models suggest the outcomes will become scattered (McKelvey (1976), 
McKelvey and Ordershook (1984), Shepsley and Weingast (1984), Schofield (1978)). 
Experimental evidence reveals the predicted “explosion” as illustrated in Figure 7B.  As can be 
seen, the data tends to be confined to a central area but the reliability and exact characterization 
do not exist.  Thus, manipulations that destroy the equilibrium do so at the risk of having the 
final outcome becoming even worse for the manipulator. A similar analysis demonstrates that the 
strategic addition of committee members can be important.  Suppose the number of committee 
members is odd and configured as in Figure 7A where no equilibrium exits.  If the number of 
committee members becomes even by the addition of a committee member whose preferences 
are in the Pareto Optimal set of the other five, such as member 6 in Figure 7C then an 
equilibrium will exist. If the optimums of multiple members are located in the Pareto set the 
Pareto Optimal of the interior members contains an equilibria.  A point on the line connecting 
members 2 and 6 in Figure 7C is an example. 
B.  Procedures and Rules 
Often committees develop and implement rules as part of the decision making process. 
Motivations include congestion, simple deference to vocal members of the committee, deference 
to expertise or the decisions of a predesignated rules committee.  Here we consider two types of 
rules.  The first involves various forms of unanimity in which one or more members are given an 
effective veto. Those with veto power ability to block options in the sense that the option cannot 
be an outcome without the approval of the group, which could be as few as one. The second 
involves the packaging and sequencing of options for vote.  
[INSERT FIGURES 7A, 7B, 7C] 
(i) Veto Players and Unanimity 
The veto power could be direct in the sense that the blocking coalitions can be exercised 
at the time of a vote.  It takes a majority to pass a motion but the blocking coalition must be part 
of that majority and if the blocking coalition does not vote unanimously in favor then the motion 
does not pass.  The power can also work indirectly. Chairpersons or others with the power to 
recognize proposals (or individuals for making proposals) effectively have veto power. Such 
powers are not dictatorial since majority rule still operates.  No proposal can pass without the 
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positive vote of a majority but the options proposed for the vote would be controlled by the 
recognition process.  The “closed rule” governing amendments and motions is such a process. 
Basic theoretical results are found in Austin-Smith and Banks (1999, 2004) and relevant 
experiments are found in Issac, et.al (1978), Bottom, et.al. (2008), Wilson (2008b), and Kagel, 
et.al, (2010). 
[INSERT FIGURES 8A AND 8B] 
Figure 8A illustrates the impact of a single veto player operating under majority rule.  In 
this case, individual 5 has veto power but a majority is required for a motion to pass.  The 
equilibrium/core given these preference configurations and with no veto player is the maximum 
of person 2 but when person 5 has the veto the equilibria/core  become the line segment 
connecting individual's 2 and 5, Koremndi and Plott (1982). As can be seen, the outcomes from 
the groups each of which is represented by an open circle are approximated by equilibria/core.  
If the configuration of individual preferences was such that no equilibrium/core exists, as 
in Figure 7A, and a committee member is given veto power, then the equilibrium/core becomes 
that person's most preferred option. For example, if person 2 in Figure 7A was given veto power 
then the core would be the single option consisting of the maximum for person 2. 
If a group operates under unanimity, each committee person has veto power, the 
equilibria/core are the Pareto Optimal options for that group.  Figure 8B is an illustration in 
which the equilibria/core the options are on the interior of the lines that connect the individual 
options - the kite shaped object. The dots within the figure illustrate typical committee decision 
within such processes.  As can be seen the outcome shift from the majority rule equilibrium to a 
pattern that is more closely related to the "center" of opinions.  Basically, unanimity tends to 
produce outcomes close to what might be considered the "fair" or "equal split" options.  How 
"strongly" or "passionate individuals might be seems to have little effect on the outcome unless 
many of the committee members do not care.  From the point of view of the manipulator, the 
advantage of unanimity over majority boils down to a preference between the equilibrium/core 
or options near the middle or "average".  
(ii)  The (Agenda) Grouping and Sequencing of Options 
Majority rule by its very nature operates in a binary fashion.  When many options are 
available, they are frequently grouped into sets, which are retained for further consideration or 
rejected. The grouping of options into such sets forms the heart of agenda theory.  
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Two types of agenda setting seem to work.  The first operates through a choice of 
dimension for voting in cases in which the language allows options to be represented in a 
multidimensional space such as those in Figure 5A and 5B.  For example if the voting process is 
posed as a choice of the distance along the horizontal axis followed by a choice along the vertical 
axis then the outcome can be substantially influenced by the choice of dimension and the 
sequence in which the voting takes place.  Without strategic behavior in which subsequent votes 
are anticipated, the model predicts the Condorcet winner, the equilibrium, along each dimension. 
The outcomes can be found by application of the classical single peaked preference procedure 
together with a specification of the order in which the dimension takes place.  Such forms of 
agenda control are extremely powerful Shepsley (1979), Shepsley and Weingast (1984), Wilson 
(2008a, 2008b). 
A second form of agenda manipulation works by strategically presenting individuals with 
choices among sets of options, as opposed to pitting one option against another.  As such, 
predictions of the effects can utilize theories about how people chose among sets and by subtly 
change the order in which sets are presented the effects of the agenda can emerge from member 
ignorance about the consequences of committee decisions that come later. 
Study Figure 9.  A group of individuals is considering four options labeled as {a, b, d, e}.  
The agenda is first to choose between vowels and consonants and then choose between letters.  
The resulting "agenda tree" is represented in Figure 9.  Suppose the committee member's 
preference was in the order a>e>b>d. Such a voter would almost certainly vote vowels on the 
first agenda item.  The model holds that people tend to use three rules {vote for best, vote against 
the worst, and vote for average} and in this case the vowels contain the best and the consonants 
hold the worst.  The decision is easy.  Suppose, however the first item on the agenda placed the 
pair {a, d} against the pair {b, e} as the first agenda item.  Being afraid the group would choose 
{d} you could vote for the {b, e} pair and if you did then the agenda manipulator who did not 
want option {a} succeeded in getting a vote against it. 
The theory works on the principle that individuals randomly use a small number of 
decision rules, Plott and Levine (1978), Levine and Plott (1977), Riker (1986).  By having some 
information about preferences and using grouping and sequencing, the undesirable from the 
point of view of the manipulator can be voted down at some stage and thus removed from further 
consideration. At each stage of the agenda, a different group can be used to remove options until 
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only favorable options remain.  The language is amazingly flexible for the purposes of grouping 
together otherwise dissimilar options.   
[INSERT FIGURE 9] 
The example may seem strained because the vowels’ and consonants’ distinction may 
have seemed excessively convenient.  In fact, the language is rich with techniques for grouping 
and sequencing in what appears on the surface to be natural ways.  Figure 10 indicates some of 
the subtle aspects of the language.  Each expression induces a different tree and each tree leads 
potentially to a different outcome.  Convenient groupings like vowels and constants will not be 
available but almost any “tree” can be induced by a sequence of “natural” sounding motions. 
Agenda theory works by keeping voters in the dark, about how others might vote on the items 
along the tree.  Slight agenda changes and straw votes should be avoided. 
[INSERT FIGURE 10] 
C. The Caucus 
The limited number of studies suggests that the caucus of subgroups prior to the meeting 
of the committee as a whole is important and can systematically influence a group choice.  The 
nature of the influence depends on the rules in force when full committee deliberations begin. 
Since the caucus does not necessarily operate to the advantage of everyone in the caucus, it pays 
to reflect on its influences before forming one. 
Figure 11 compares committee choices with unrestricted caucuses representing outcomes 
similar to those reported by Hoffman (1983) and can be compared to processes in which 
subgroup meetings interact with the group as a whole while following well-defined rules. Figure 
11A is the pattern of committee preferences used for orientation of results.  All subgroups had an 
opportunity to meet and discuss the upcoming meeting prior to the meeting or the whole 
committee.  Two rules governing the procedures used by the committee of the whole are 
reported. The committee of the whole operates under majority rule but the rules governing the 
committee as a whole differed according to whether or not the floor must allow deliberation on 
all proposals.  The feature-required deliberation is an element of widely used Roberts Rules. 
Majority rule was always operative.  
Figure 11B represents the committee of the whole decisions when the required 
deliberation feature of Roberts Rules was not in place and Figure 11C represents the decisions 
when the rule was in place. As can be seen, the variance in outcome is greater under the caucus 
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when the most deliberate feature of Robert’s Rules is not part of the rules.  The process begins 
with a coalition with forms during the caucus. Coalitions of a simple majority always formed. 
The coalition approaches the committee meeting with an agreed upon option.  The option was 
proposed and a vote was taken without further discussion. The coalition simply informed the 
others that it was a majority and it had made a decision. That is, if the coalition was a majority, it 
implemented an option close to the one that resulted from private deliberations.  The caucus 
proposals were typically influenced in the direction of the center of the opinions of the caucus 
members.  The caucus tends to operate under unanimity so it supports an option at the center of 
the preference of its members.  The variance of outcomes shown in the figure 11B reflects the 
variance of groups that had a successful caucus. 
The dynamics differed if committees operated with required recognition and discussion 
of motions. Deviations of the final committee choice from this initial coalition position reflect 
concessions made on the floor during the committee meeting.  In particular, the concessions are 
usually necessary to appease the individual at the core/equilibrium who is actually worse off for 
having joined the coalition.  Had that agent refused to join, the group would have automatically 
chosen his/her maximum.  New proposals and discussion bring that fact into the open. 
[INSERT FIGURES 11A, 11B, AND 11C] 
As can be seen in Figure 11C the decisions move to near the equilibrium/core of the 
committee of the whole. The fact that the caucus was successful when the required discussion 
feature of Robert’s Rules were not used is important.  Rules that prolong considerations, force 
recognition of motions or amendments, and require discussion of options endanger the 
effectiveness of the caucus.  Competing motions make policing member votes difficult. The 
individuals who are bound to lose from the caucus will likely discover their folly during 
protracted discussions. When they recognize the advantage of competing motions, they tend to 
defect from the coalition.   
The implication is that the caucus is an effective but unstable tool to use for influencing 
group choice.  Its advantage as a tool for influencing groups depends upon the location of the 
manipulator’s preferences relative to others.  A manipulator near the core/equilibrium should not 
want caucuses.  A manipulator far removed from the others might be helped by caucus 
opportunities.  A committee member who faces undesirable proposals from a caucus and wants 
14 
 
to counter should prolong the meeting and discussion with alternative proposals aimed at luring 
some member away from the caucus proposal. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Bill Riker coined the term “heresthetics” to describe the political manipulation (1986).  He 
described a wide-ranging class of strategies taken from historical examples.   His examples 
included the skilled use of the language that can confuse or mislead.  He appropriately designates 
that topic as an “art” but he clearly outlines an underlying science.   By contrast, the examples 
outlined here flow from a narrow, analytical structure within which basic principles tend to 
emerge. Perhaps the study of the art when integrated with the analytical structure will be useful 
to those who seek to improve the methods through which collective decisions are made. 
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Figure 1 
     
1 2 3  outcome 
X Y Z Majority order X>Y>Z>X Order dependent 
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Question Example option in 
the “blank 
Tree Diagram 
Do we want ____ or 
do we not? 
x 
x 
y 
z 
x 
y 
z 
y 
z 
Do we want ____ ? 
x x 
y 
z 
x 
x 
y 
z 
Can we eliminate ________? 
x 
x 
y 
z 
Y 
z 
x 
y 
z 
y 
x 
y 
z 
x 
y 
x 
y 
z 
Of the two, which shall we 
eliminate? {x, y} 
x 
y 
z 
X 
z 
y 
z 
Of the two, which do we 
prefer?  
{x,y} 
x 
y 
z 
X 
z 
z 
y 
y 
z 
x 
z 
z 
y 
z 
x 
y 
x 
z 
z 
Figure 10  
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